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In estimating a gravity model it is essential to analyse not just bilateral
trade resistance, the barriers to trade between a pair of countries, but also
multilateral trade resistance (MTR), the barriers to trade that each country
faces with all its trading partners. Without correctly modelling MTR, it is
impossible either to obtain accurate estimates of the effects on trade of
exchange rate regimes and other variables or to perform accurate
counterfactual simulations of trade patterns under other assumptions
about exchange rate regimes or other variables. In this paper we
implement a number of different ways of modelling MTR – both for a
standard gravity model and for an extended model which includes a full
range of bilateral exchange rate regimes – notably several variants of the
technique developed by Baier and Bergstrand (2006), which turn out to
produce broadly similar results. We then illustrate our preferred approach
by carrying out simulations of the effects of the creation of an East
African currency union and the effects of a withdrawal from EMU by
Italy.
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In the modern version of the empirical gravity model trade flows between countries 
are determined not only by the conventional Newtonian factors of economic mass and 
distance, but also by the ratio of ‘bilateral’ to ‘multilateral’ trade resistance. Bilateral 
trade resistance (BTR) is the size of the barriers to trade between countries i and j, 
while multilateral trade resistance (MTR) refers to the barriers which each of i and j 
face in their trade with all their trading partners (including domestic or internal trade).  
The presence of multilateral trade resistance is what distinguishes this ‘new’ version 
of the gravity model, as developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004), from 
the ‘empirical’ or ‘traditional’ version used by earlier researchers such as Rose 
(2000). It introduces a substitutability between trade with a country’s different 
partners which was previously lacking. 
 
For example, trade between France and Italy depends on how costly it is for each to 
trade with the other relative to the costs involved for each of them in trading with 
other countries. Hence a reduction in the bilateral trade barrier between France and a 
third country such as the UK would reduce France’s multilateral trade resistance. 
Although the bilateral trade barrier between France and Italy is unaffected, the fall in 
France’s MTR caused by the decline in the UK-France bilateral barrier leads to a 
diversion of bilateral trade away from France-Italy trade and towards France-UK 
trade. Moreover, as Baier and Bergstrand (2006) show, there is a further effect which 
operates in the opposite direction: the fall in France’s MTR generates a (small) fall in 
the average of all countries’ MTRs, which they call world trade resistance (WTR), 
and this encourages international trade instead of internal or domestic trade. The 
consequence of the reduction in the France-UK BTR for trade between France and 
Italy is the net of the bilateral trade diversion effect away from France-Italy trade and   2
towards France-UK trade and the smaller multilateral trade creation effect away from 
internal France-France trade towards France’s trade with all its international trading 
partners including Italy. 
 
It follows, therefore, that these third-party effects need to be properly taken into 
account in an accurate evaluation of the effect on trade flows of changes in, for 
example, exchange rate regimes.  Indeed, one of the major criticisms of earlier uses of 
the gravity models to examine the effects of currency unions on trade, such as Rose 
(2000) and Frankel and Rose (2002), was that the failure to control for multilateral 
trade resistance imparted a severe upward bias to the estimated effect of currency 
unions on trade, thereby leading to the implausibly large point estimates emerging 
from these early studies (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). 
 
In this paper we build on previous work (Adam and Cobham, 2007) in which we 
examined the impact on trade flows of exchange rate arrangements using a more 
detailed classification of bilateral exchange rate regimes than either the simple 
currency union effect used in Rose (2000) or the currency union/direct peg/indirect 
peg classification used by Klein and Shambaugh (2004). As already argued, a proper 
modelling of MTR is essential for the correct estimation of the effects of exchange 
rate regimes on trade: in Adam and Cobham (2007), following Feenstra (2005), we 
controlled for MTR effects using country-level fixed effects.  However, this approach 
offers only a partial solution to the problem of modelling MTR in panel-data, for two 
reasons.  The first is that, unless they are interacted with time, country fixed effects 
control for average trade resistance over time, even though key elements of trade 
resistance, such as the exchange rate regime, may be time-varying. Second, we are   3
also interested in developing the capacity to simulate the effects on trade between 
countries of different exchange rate regimes, and for that we need to be able to 
estimate MTR in such a way that we can then take account of the consequences of 
varying the individual components of trade resistance.
1  
 
In section 1 we briefly introduce the canonical gravity model in order to define MTR 
formally and to discuss the alternative methods of modelling trade resistance found in 
the literature. In section 2 we report the results of estimating a basic empirical model 
with standard control variables, and then supplement it with our classification of 
exchange rate regimes.  Initially we omit MTR (so that the model represents a 
‘traditional’ version of the gravity model).  In section 3 we then add, first, country 
fixed effects, which have been widely used in the literature as one way of dealing with 
MTR, and then (instead) country pair fixed effects. In section 4 we introduce various 
versions of a method of estimating MTR through linear-approximation pioneered by 
Baier and Berstrand (2006), and in section 5 we consider the sensitivity of the 
estimates of the exchange rate regime effects to these alternative specifications of 
MTR. In section 6 we present, as an example of the method, simulations of the effect 
of the formation of a currency union in East Africa covering Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, and of the departure of Italy from EMU. Section 7 concludes. 
 
1  Modelling multilateral trade resistance 
A formal gravity model 
We use a model developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in which each 
country  1... in = produces a single good and consumes a constant elasticity of 
substitution composite defined over all n goods, including home production.
2  For the   4
moment, we suppress any dynamic aspects so that the model describes trade flows 
across a single time period. All countries trade with each other, but because of natural 
and other barriers, cross-border trade is costly.  Utility maximization by each country, 
subject to its budget constraint, the structure of trade costs and the set of market 
clearing conditions for each good, leads to the following equation for bilateral trade 
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where  ij F  denotes the volume of trade between countries i and j, yi and yj are their 
respective total expenditures (proxied by GDP), and y
W is global GDP.  Bilateral trade 
resistance is denoted by tij which represents the gross mark-up in country j of country 
i’s good over its domestic producer price: trade resistance is assumed to be symmetric 
so that tij= tji.  Pi and Pj are the CES consumer price indices for i and j respectively 
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− =  denotes the share of country j in country i’s consumption.  Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) refer to Pi and Pj as ‘multilateral trade resistance’ since each 
is a function of that country’s full set of bilateral trade resistance terms (including 
internal trade resistance which is normalised to  1 ii t = ).  Finally, σ is the elasticity of 
substitution between all goods (assumed to be greater than one so that, for example, 
an increase in bilateral trade costs has a negative effect on bilateral trade flows).  
   5
Bilateral trade resistance is defined as a function of a vector of continuous variables, 
including some measure of distance and population (where the latter reflects the ease 
of domestic rather than international trade), and a set of binary indicator variables 
reflecting, for example, whether two countries have a common border, the nature of 
their prior and existing colonial relations, and whether they have some particular trade 
or exchange rate arrangement.  The seminal paper by Rose (2000) focussed in 
particular on the role of currency unions, while more recent work by Klein and 
Shambaugh (2004) widens the net to examine the contribution of fixed exchange rate 
regimes on trade flows.  Adam and Cobham (2007) introduce a much more detailed 
classification of de facto bilateral exchange rate arrangements. A variant of that 
classification is used in this paper and is explained in section 2.  For the moment we 
note that each bilateral exchange rate regime, h=1…l  can be denoted by an indicator 
variable   =1  
h
ij D if the bilateral regime between countries i  and  j  is  h  and zero 
otherwise. Combining these three groups of variables we specify the bilateral trade 
cost function as  
12
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where  d denotes a measure of distance, pop is population and b  is the vector of 
indicator variables reflecting other barriers to trade.  Taking logs of (1) and 
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where the constant term  0 ln
W y β =  represents world GDP, and the error term  ij ε is a 
composite of the stochastic error in (1) and the residual term in the trade cost function 
(3).  Notice, also, that the theory underpinning equation (1) implies  1 1 β = , although 
we do not impose this restriction.  
 
 
Estimating the gravity model 
Empirical estimation of (4) has to take account of the fact that Pi and Pj are not 
directly observable.  Three approaches have been developed to address this problem.  
First, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) solve for Pi and Pj in terms of the 
observable determinants of the trade barrier (equation (3)) and then estimate (1) using 
a customised non-linear estimation technique designed for their particular model. 
Although this approach is feasible for the model with which Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) work, where both the number of observations and the number of 
variables are relatively limited, and where the model is estimated on a single cross-
section only, it becomes infeasible in our case where (see below) our regression 
includes a vector of 11 control variables covering countries’ geographical and cultural 
features, colonial relationships and trade arrangements and 30 indicator variables for  
the different exchange rate regimes, and is estimated over an unbalanced panel of 165 
countries over 32 years. A second, widely-used and less cumbersome, alternative, 
adopted by Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Mélitz (e.g. 2007) amongst others, is to 
proxy the multilateral terms by country-specific fixed effects.  The multilateral trade 
resistance terms are therefore replaced by a vector of N country-specific indicator 
variables   and  ij CC , each taking  the value of 1 for trade flows between i and j and   7
zero otherwise.  The coefficients on these indicators (
(1 ) ln( ) ii P
σ κ
− =  and 
(1 ) ln( ) jj P
σ κ
− =  ) measure the common element in each country’s trade with every 
other country, which is precisely the notion of multilateral trade resistance.  As 
Feenstra (2005) and others make clear, OLS estimation of (4) under this modification 
generates consistent estimates of the multilateral trade resistance. 
  
Third, Baier and Bergstrand (2006) have proposed the use of a first-order Taylor 
series expansion to generate a linear approximation to the multilateral trade resistance 
terms in (2). This allows for the separate components of the Pi and Pj functions to be 
estimated by OLS rather than by non-linear estimation.  Baier and Bergstrand show 
that in the context of Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) model of border effects on 
trade between Canada and the US the bias involved in using these linear 
approximations relative to non-linear estimation is small. The approximation also 
introduces a third term, in addition to the two countries’ multilateral trade resistance, 
which they call ‘world trade resistance’, and which is a function of the multilateral 
trade resistance faced by every country in the world. The intuition is that the 
importance of the average trade barrier one country faces depends on the average 
trade barriers all countries face. Thus, French-Italian trade, for example, is affected by 
the specific bilateral barrier between them, relative to the average trade barrier which 
each of them faces, which in turn has to be considered relative to the average trade 
barrier all countries in the world face.   
 
Extending the basic model for panel-data estimation 
In this paper we exploit a large panel data set.  However, equation (4) is correctly 
specified for estimation only in the case of a single cross section of data – as is done   8
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).  When estimated on panel data two potential 
sources of bias need to be considered.  The first and less serious arises from the use of 
constant price trade data.  In keeping with much of the literature in this area we 
measure trade flows in constant US dollars, but as Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) note, 
any trend in US inflation will generate an omitted variable bias in the parameter 
estimates. Since all trade data are deflated in the same way, however, a vector of time 
dummies controls for this (and any other) source of common time-varying variation.  
 
The second and potentially more serious problem arises when some elements of the 
multilateral trade resistance terms vary over time.  While many of the elements of the 
trade-cost function such as geographical, cultural or historical characteristics are 
intrinsically time-invariant, others, most notably exchange rate arrangements, are 
not.
3  It follows that proxying for unobserved MTR using only country-specific 
dummy variables controls for only the average over time of multilateral trade 
resistance and not the time-varying component.  The time-varying component 
becomes part of the equation error and hence represents a potential source of bias if it 
is correlated with the variables of interest.  Since the time-varying component of 
multilateral trade resistance – that is, the evolution of the vector of pair-wise exchange 
rate regimes – is necessarily correlated with the vector of bilateral exchange rate 
regimes, this bias is highly likely to be present.  We therefore see it as essential to 
allow for relevant time variation in the multilateral trade resistance terms.  In 
principle, country fixed effects could be interacted with time to remove this source of 
bias, but this would entail adding an additional NT regressors (over 5,000 in this case) 
to the model, rendering estimation difficult if not impossible. 
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Even if it were feasible to estimate the model in this fashion, it would still not allow 
us to compute the specific variation in the MTR terms if we wished to simulate the 
consequences for trade of varying one or more than one country’s exchange rate 
regime. For both reasons, therefore, the approach of Baier and Bergstrand (2006), is 
preferable (though fairly complex in a model of this size) and in what follows we 
present below a number of estimations using techniques based on it.  For comparison, 
however, we also report results from estimates with constant CFEs, and we use them 
later on in a different context. 
 
Estimating Equation 
In the light of the above we define our estimating equations for panel data.  We first 
index the log of equation (1) and the trade cost function (3) by t.  In the case where we 
control for MTR solely by including country fixed effects, our estimating equation 
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where the vector b includes both time-varying and time-invariant control variables 
and a tilde (~) above a coefficient denotes the product of the coefficient as it appears 
in the trade cost function (3) and (1 ) σ −  where σ is the elasticity of substitution in 
consumption between commodities of different origins. Thus  (1 ) ii δ σδ =− % , 
(1 ) σ =− αα %  and  (1 )
hh γ σγ =− % . A set of T-1 year dummies, denoted yrt, are also 
included to capture excluded or unobserved common time-varying effects.  Country-  10
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Representing multilateral trade resistance solely in terms of linear approximations to 
equation (2) as in Baier and Bergstrand (2006) leads to an estimating equation in 








= ∑  is eliminated.  Instead, each element of 
the trade cost function is defined to reflect its contribution to the bilateral and 
multilateral trade resistance.  Hence for any variable,  ijt x , which is defined on a 
country-pair basis (by year), its contribution to overall trade between i and j consists 
of three components: a direct impact on bilateral trade,  ijt x ; an effect operating 
through the impact on the multilateral trade resistance of country i and country j 
defined as  jt ijt
j
x θ ∑ for country i and  it ijt
i
x θ ∑ for country j respectively; and a final 
effect from the impact on world trade resistance, defined as  it jt ijt
ij
x θθ ∑∑  where  it θ  




θ =  ) depending on the point around which the linear approximation to MTR is 
taken (see Section 4 and Appendix B). 
 
Collecting these terms, our estimating equation takes the form  
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Finally, where we allow for the possibility that there may be country specific factors 
determining trade that are not otherwise captured by the linear approximation to the 








= ∑ to equation (7). 
 
In either case the gravity model is estimated by ordinary least squares.  Given that the 
data are defined for country-pairs by year basis we report, and base our inference on, 




2  Adding exchange rate regimes to a standard model 
In this section we present results without including any MTR terms, but including 
year dummies throughout.
4 We start with a standard model which includes GDP, 
population, distance and the standard control variables used by Rose (2000) and 
others in this literature. The latter cover geographic and cultural features – log product 
of area, whether one or both countries is landlocked, whether either or both are 
islands, whether the two countries share a common border, whether they share a 
common language; features that refer to history and colonial status – whether the two 
countries have been colonised by the same colonial master, whether one is or ever 
was a colony of the other, whether they form part of the same country; and trade   12
arrangements – whether the two countries are members of a regional trade agreement 
and whether one has extended GSP preferences to the other (full details of these 
variables are given in Appendix A). We then extend the standard model by adding a 
set of dummy variables for the exchange rate regimes between each pair of countries. 
 
The latter are based on the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004; see also 2003a, 2003b) 
classification of exchange rate regimes on a de facto, rather than de jure, basis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s 15 (unilateral) regimes are aggregated into six: currency 
union/currency board; peg; managed float with a reference currency; managed float 
without a reference (where we include currencies managed with only a rather loose 
relationship to the reference currency, in line with Reinhart and Rogoff’s ‘fine 
codes’); free fall; and free float. Table 1 shows this aggregation. A set of  29 zero-one 
dummy variables are then defined for the (bilateral) regimes between countries, taking 
account of the specific anchor or reference currencies being used by different 
countries.
5 Table 2 sets out the definitions of each of these variables (in the 
regressions below the default category is MANMAN where both countries are 
managing floats without reference currencies).  
 
In line with the literature spawned by Rose (2000), we expect that (the coefficient on) 
SAMECU, where two countries are members of the same currency union, will be 
strongly positive, and we expect positive but successively smaller effects for 
SAMEPEG, where two countries are pegging to the same anchor, and SAMEREF, 
where they are both managing their floats with reference to the same currency. For 
exchange rate regimes which cross the main categories or involve different anchors, 
pegs or reference currencies, we distinguish three different effects:   13
(i) any exchange rate regime between two countries which reduces uncertainty and 
transactions costs relative to the default regime will tend to increase the trade between 
them: this is a positive direct effect;  
(ii) an exchange rate regime between two countries may affect their trade negatively 
(relative to the default regime) by encouraging one country to replace trade with the 
other by trade with a third country with which it has a ‘closer’ exchange rate regime: 
this is a (negative) substitution effect; and 
(iii) a regime may affect trade positively via an indirect reduction in transactions 
costs, in the case where the producers of a country which trades with more than one 
user of a single currency, or (to a lesser extent) with more than one country that pegs 
to the same vehicle currency, can economise on working balances in the single or the 
vehicle currency; this is a positive indirect effect.  
 
Table 3 presents the results for estimating the two models on our dataset without any 
MTR terms. The coefficients on the basic regressors accord reasonably well with 
theory, with cross-border trade increasing in the log-product of GDP and decreasing 
in the log product of population and the log of distance between countries.
6 The 
coefficients on the standard control variables also have signs and magnitudes in line 
with theory and results elsewhere, and all except island and common country are 
significant. The time-dummies are jointly significant.  When we add the exchange rate 
regime dummies in equation [2], the coefficients on the basic and standard control 
variables are little changed. The exchange rate dummies are jointly significant, and 22 
out of 29 of the individual regimes are significantly different from zero. We discuss 
the results for the different exchange rate regimes further in section 5, but it is worth 
noting here that SAMECU has clearly the largest coefficient, while regimes involving   14
a freely falling rate, e.g. MANFALL, FALLFALL, tend to have the lowest. The 
adjusted R-squared rises from 0.667 in equation [1] to 0.671 in equation [2].  
 
3  Adding country fixed effects and country pair fixed effects 
We now add country fixed effects (CFEs) to each of the models in Table 3. As noted 
above, these effects can be thought of theoretically as approximations to MTR terms.  
Strictly, they control for the average MTR, but because many of the trade cost factors 
change over time this approximation may not be accurate.  The country fixed effects 
also control for any other time-invariant country-specific determinants of trade not 
otherwise picked up by the vector of controls (e.g. if countries vary in their propensity 
to trade internationally for reasons not otherwise reflected in the trade cost function).  
 
Table 4 presents the results. In each case the country effects are jointly significant, 
and inspection of the individual results shows that a high proportion of the individual 
country dummies are significant. Furthermore the adjusted R-squareds are higher in 
each case, by just over 0.03, which is large relative to the variation between the results 
within Table 3 (or Table 4).
7 At the same time the coefficients on the basic and 
standard control variables and on the constant are in most cases a little smaller in 
absolute terms than those in Table 3. 19 of the 29 exchange rate effects are now 
significant. In general the pattern of the coefficients is closer to what might have been 
expected: for example, DIFFREF is now below SAMEREF, and the lowest regime is 
now FALLFALL.  
 
Next we replace the CFEs by country pair fixed effects (CPFEs).  In contrast to CFEs, 
country-pair fixed effects do not emerge directly from the Anderson-van Wincoop   15
(2003) model. However, they can be motivated from a purely econometric perspective 
as a means of controlling for unobserved or unobservable country-pair specific factors 
not picked up elsewhere in the model (see, for example Carrère (2006) and Egger 
(2007).  
 
Table 5 presents the results of adding CPFEs (in place of CFEs) to the two equations 
in the previous tables. Many of the control variables are dropped, since they are 
country pair-specific and constant over time. The coefficients on the other basic and 
standard control variables are all lower than in Table 3 (with the GDP coefficient now 
less than unity and regional trade agreement now significantly negative). The 
exchange rate regime dummies are also mostly smaller in magnitude, and only 10 are 
individually significant. On the other hand the year dummies, the CPFE dummies and 
the exchange rate regime dummies are each jointly significant in each equation. 
However, what is most striking about these results – which recur in any other 
equations where we have tried CPFEs – is the low value of the within-groups R-
squared, which indicates the extent to which the variation in bilateral trade flows can 
be explained by the model once we have controlled for country-pair fixed effects. The 
fact that the within-groups R-squared is less than 0.1 across all such variants of the 
model indicates that when CPFEs are included they do nearly all of the work, because 
many of the control variables (including the exchange rate regimes) are relatively 
constant over time on a country-pair basis. But that means that including CPFEs does 
not allow us to identify the effects in which we are interested, notably the effects of 
the exchange rate regimes. In addition, the overall R-squareds in these cases are well 
below those in any of the other regressions which we report. 
   16
4  Modelling MTRs via Taylor approximations 
We now turn to the third approach to modelling MTR, that proposed by Baier & 
Bergstrand (2006). This approach uses a first-order Taylor series expansion to 
approximate the multilateral price resistance terms, which makes it possible to 
separate out the different terms in the Pi and Pj functions presented in equation (2) and 
use OLS rather than non-linear estimation. Baier and Bergstrand show that (in some 
cases at least) the bias involved in their approximation is small. Their technique also 
introduces a third term, ‘world trade resistance’, which is a function of the multilateral 
trade resistance faced by every country in the world.
8   
 
Baier and Bergstrand discuss two alternative centres for their Taylor expansion. The 
first is a frictionless equilibrium, i.e. one where the trade cost factor tij = t = 1 for all 
i,j = 1…N. The second – which they prefer – is a symmetric equilibrium, where tij = t 
> 1 for all i,j = 1…N and the shares in world GDP of all countries are the same, θi = 
1/N for all i,j = 1…N. It turns out that in the first case the trade cost factors are 
weighted by the GDP shares in the expressions for the MTR terms in the final 
estimating equation, while in the second case the trade cost factors are equally 
weighted. Neither of these centres is intuitively attractive in our case, where there are 
substantial trade costs and countries’ GDP shares vary enormously (as between, say, 
the US and Grenada). However, we show in Appendix B that it is possible to 
implement the Taylor expansion around a centre where there are common trade costs 
and also common MTRs between countries, and this generates the same estimating 
equation as in Baier and Bergstrand’s frictionless equilibrium case. Accordingly in 
what follows we present results for the cases where (a) the trade costs are weighted by 
GDP shares (Baier and Bergstrand’s frictionless centre or our common trade costs and   17




Table 6 reproduces equation [1], the simplest case for the basic model, and contrasts it 
with the results of including MTR (and WTR) terms, using first GDP weights 
(equation [8]) and then equal weights ([9]). Population, distance and the standard 
controls are all included in the MTR terms. There is some variation in the constant 
term, but little variation in the other coefficients or in the R-squared.  
 
Table 7 presents the corresponding estimates for the full model including exchange 
rate regimes. Here all the regimes enter into the MTR terms, as well as the other 
variables. With respect to the constant and the basic and standard control variables the 
results are comparable to those in Table 6: some variation in the constant term but not 
much in the other coefficients or in the R-squared. For the exchange rate effects, 
however, there are some small variations in the relative pattern, particularly as 
between the GDP weights case (equation [11]) and either the without-MTR case 
(equation [10] = [2] in Table 2) or the equal-weights case (equation [12]).  
 
Theoretically equations [11] and [12] allow fully for multilateral trade resistance.  It is 
possible, however, that there remains some variation in the data which is country 
specific and constant over time. We therefore rerun the equations with CFEs in 
addition to the treatment of MTR, with the results shown in Table 8. Here equation 
[13] is the without-MTR specification of equation [4] in Table 3, while [14] and [15] 
have GDP-weighted MTRs and equally-weighted MTRs respectively. As between 
these three equations the differences are comparable to those in Table 7: some   18
variation in the constant terms but little in the basic and standard control variables or 
in the R-squared. As between Tables 7 and 8 the results in Table 8 involve 
substantially higher R-squareds, of the order of 0.705 as opposed to the 0.670 in Table 
7, which suggests that even when the MTR terms are included there are substantial 
country-specific factors determining trade patterns not captured by the factors 
included in the empirical trade cost function; the general pattern of the regime effects 
is also more plausible, as with the results of Table 4 relative to those of Table 3.
10   
 
5  Robustness and plausibility 
So far we have presented a variety of estimates made in different ways. Here we 
consider the robustness of these estimates and the plausibility of the preferred results. 
A first point to note is that, with the exception of the inclusion of country pair fixed 
effects, the various approaches used on the standard model (without exchange rate 
regimes) make little difference to the results for that model: the findings are robust, in 
the sense that adding CFES or including the MTR/WTR terms do not change the 
estimates significantly.  
 
When we supplement the basic model with exchange rate regimes the estimated 
coefficients move rather more, particularly as between when CFEs are and are not 
included. But how we choose to control for MTR, whether by using country fixed 
effects or by means of an explicit linear approximation, makes little difference to the 
estimated coefficients, as can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the coefficients from 
the three regressions in Table 8. It is clear that the three sets of coefficients are very 
close, which has two important implications. First, modelling the MTRs or simply 
controlling for them through dummy variables makes surprisingly little difference to   19
the estimated coefficients – but without explicit modelling, it is not possible to carry 
out proper simulations or, indeed, to identify the ‘marginal’ effects of the exchange 
rate regimes. Second, when a linear approximation to the true MTR is employed, the 
choice of centre for the Taylor expansion has little effect on the estimated exchange 
rate coefficients. Baier and Bergstrand’s frictionless centre, or our common trade 
costs and common MTRs centre, which imply trade cost factors being weighted by 
GDP, generate virtually the same coefficient estimates as their symmetric equilibrium 
centre which implies equal-weighting across countries. However, in the present 
dataset the differences in country sizes are so large that the common trade costs and 
common MTRs centre seems clearly more appropriate. For this reason we focus in 
what follows mainly on the results of equation [14]. 
 
Figure 2 adds to Figure 1 the coefficients from the three equations in Table 7, where 
no CFEs are included in the regressions. These results are again very close to each 
other, but they differ somewhat from those in Table 8. There are two points worth 
making here. First, on econometric grounds the inclusion of CFEs is preferable, 
because of the considerable rise in the adjusted R-squared. Second, as already noted, 
the pattern of the exchange rate regime coefficients is much more plausible in the 
CFE case: SAMECU > SAMECUPEG > SAMEPEG, though SAMEPEG is still < 
SAMEREF; SAME– coefficients are now invariably > DIFF– coefficients; 
FALLFALL is now the lowest coefficient; the –FLOAT coefficients are smaller than 
in Table 7 though still significantly positive, and so on.  
 
Figure 3 shows, in descending order, the point estimates for the exchange rate regime 
coefficients from equation [14] in Table 8, together with 95% confidence intervals.   20
Much the largest coefficient is that for SAMECU, which offers some support for 
Rose’s (2000) initial intuition. At the other end MANFALL, PEGFALL and 
FALLFALL are all negative, though not significantly below the default regime, 
MANMAN, while CUFALL, CUMAN and PEGMAN are positive but not significant. 
In between there is a range of regimes with coefficients between 0.15 and 0.56, nearly 
all significantly different from zero but some more precisely defined than others.
11  
 
One way of summarising the effect of the exchange rate regimes is to take 
(unweighted) averages of the coefficients for each type of regime in association with 
itself and each other regime (ignoring DIFF– and ANCHOR– coefficients): for 
example, the average of SAMECU, SAMECUPEG, SAMECUREF, CUMAN, 
CUFLOAT and CUFALL is 0.39, while the corresponding average for the –PEG 
regimes is 0.28, that for the –REF regimes is 0.33, that for the –MAN regimes is 0.07, 
that for the –FALL regimes is 0.05, and that for the FLOAT regimes is 0.36. Our prior 
expectation was that the –REF regimes would have smaller positive effects on trade 
than the –PEG regimes; the fact that the comparison goes (slightly) the other way may 
suggest that the distinction Reinhart and Rogoff make between their coarse codes 
2(peg)-4 and 5-9 is not really watertight. We also would have expected a larger 
difference between the –MAN regimes and the –FALL regimes. The –FLOAT 
regimes, it should be noted, are relatively small categories (see Table 2) which are 
dominated by a small number of developed countries (three quarters of the 
observations involve one or more of the US, Australia, Japan and pre-EMU 
Germany). Those countries are relatively intense participants in international trade, so 
when CFEs are included they have relatively high CFEs; when the CFEs are not 
included the effect goes partly into the –FLOAT coefficients.    21
 
6  The size of exchange rate effects: some illustrative simulations 
We turn finally to the size of the effects of exchange rate regimes on trade.  A first 
point to note is that, although the partial r-squareds reported for equation [14] in Table 
8 emphasise that in general exchange rate effects explain a much lower proportion of 
the variation in trade compared to the core Newtonian determinants, these effects are 
both jointly and individually significant. Nonetheless, a direct comparison of our 
results with other similar estimates is difficult. While our point estimate for SAMECU 
of 0.96 (equation [14]) is a little larger than the corresponding point estimate (of 0.86) 
by Rose and van Wincoop (2001), the comparison is not very informative. Our 
estimate measures the result of two countries which had both previously been 
managing their currencies without a reference joining the same currency union, 
whereas Rose and van Wincoop’s estimate measures the effect of two countries 
joining the same currency union from a starting position represented by the average 
of all other exchange rate arrangements.  Hence, the true difference between the two 
estimates is substantial.
12  In addition, these numbers give the ‘average’ or partial 
equilibrium impact, and need to be combined with the associated MTR and WTR 
effects in order to generate accurate ‘marginal’ estimates of the effect of such a 
regime change. To illustrate this, we present the results of two specific simulations, 
which are strictly designed to illustrate our method rather than to intervene in 
particular policy debates: we consider the impact on their trade of the formation of a 
new East African currency union (with a brand new currency) between Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda; and the impact on Italy’s trade of its withdrawal from EMU. 
We report the change in a country’s overall trade, and the distribution of that trade 
between various currency/regional blocs: the US $ bloc (the US plus countries which   22
are in a currency union with the dollar or have a currency board on the dollar); 
Europe; (the rest of) Latin America; (the rest of) Asia; Africa, divided into the East 
African Community (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) and the rest; and other. 
 
The trade volumes and shares were generated by (i) assuming the country concerned 
switched its exchange rate regime in the way indicated, (ii) finding the value of the 
implied change in the dummy variable referring to that country’s bilateral exchange 
rate regime with each of its partners, (iii) calculating the implied change in the 
multilateral trade resistance of each country, (iv) calculating the corresponding 
implied change in world trade resistance, and (v) applying the changes under (ii), (iii) 
and (iv) to the actual trade patterns of each country in 2003.
13  
 
As of 2003 Kenya and Tanzania each have managed floats (without reference 
currencies), while Uganda has a free float. Case I of Table 9 considers a currency 
union between Kenya and Tanzania only. Kenya and Tanzania experience increases in 
their total trade of 13% and 15.4% respectively; these overall effects are made up of 
direct effects of 13.2% and 15.6% which are offset by (negative) MTR effects of 
0.5% and 0.6% and (positive) WTR effects of 0.3% and 0.4%. The MTR and WTR 
effects here are relatively small; the reason for this is that Kenya and Tanzania each 
account for very small shares of world GDP (as shown at the bottom of Table 9), so 
the changes in their exchange rate regimes have quite small effects both on their own 
MTRs and on the MTRs of their trading partners. In terms of the distribution of trade, 
Kenya and Tanzania each trade significantly more with each other (the shares more 
than double), and there are a range of different effects on their trade with other 
countries.   23
 
In case II Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda all make a currency union together. The 
overall effects are larger – e.g. Kenya’s trade increases by 19.8% - and the MTR and 
WTR effects are slightly larger: the three countries account for 0.23% of world GDP 
(as opposed to 0.175% in case I). In terms of the distribution of their trade, there are 
much larger increases in inter-EAC trade, and larger falls or smaller rises in the shares 
of trade with other trading blocs: with three countries involved in the currency union 
there are stronger substitution effects towards inter-union trade and away from trade 
with non-members.  
 
In case III we consider a roughly opposite change in which Italy leaves an existing 
large currency union and its currency is now managed (without a reference currency). 
The direct effect is a fall in Italian trade of 36.1%, offset by a positive MTR effect of 
4.4% and a negative WTR effect of 1.7%, to give an overall fall in Italian trade of 
33.4%. Here the MTR and WTR effects are considerably larger than in the previous 
cases, since Italy accounts for 2.7% of world GDP and the change in its exchange rate 
regime therefore has a larger impact on its own and other countries’ MTRs. Italy’s 
trade with Europe naturally experiences a very large fall, while its trade with other 
blocs is (in absolute terms) relatively unchanged. 
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we have estimated different versions of a gravity model, from the most 
basic to one which includes a full menu of exchange rate regimes, using a variety of 
techniques. First, we have shown that when country pair fixed effects are included 
they do most of the work and it is not possible to identify the effects which interest us,   24
notably those of exchange rate regimes. On the other hand country fixed effects seem 
to improve the explanatory power of the equations without having major impacts on 
the coefficients estimated for the other explanatory variables.  
 
Second, we have implemented the Baier and Bergstrand (2006) method of dealing 
with multilateral (and world) trade resistance, which employs a Taylor expansion to 
obtain an estimable linear equation from the non-linear equation which comes out of 
the theoretical model. We have done this using both GDP weights – which can be 
motivated either by Baier and Bergstrand’s frictionless centre or by our common trade 
costs and common MTR centre – and equal weights, which can be motivated by Baier 
and Bergstrand’s symmetric centre. The results do not differ much, but for our 
dataset, with its enormous differences in country sizes, we believe that our common 
trade costs and common MTRs centre, which leads to GDP weights on the trade cost 
factors in the MTR terms, is clearly preferable. When we implement the Baier and 
Bergstrand method we still find that adding country fixed effects improves the 
explanatory power, without greatly affecting the individual coefficient estimates. It 
also produces a pattern of exchange rate regime effects which is much closer to a 
priori expectations. CFEs should therefore be included. 
 
Third, we have shown that the exchange rate regime effects estimated without 
MTR/WTR terms or with them under different weights are very close to each other. 
However, in order to identify the ‘marginal’ effect of exchange rate regimes it is 
essential to include the MTR terms and take account of how they vary in response to a 
counterfactual change in a regime.  
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Finally, we have shown that it is possible to analyse the effect of a counterfactual 
change in a country’s exchange rate regime, by simulating the change in its trade with 
each of its trading partners in a way that takes account of the change in regime with 
each partner and the associated changes in MTRs and WTR. Our illustrations, for the 
East African countries and for Italy, show that when the countries concerned are large 
relative to world GDP the MTR/WTR effects are large enough to make the ‘average’ 
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Notes
 
1  A recent paper by Egger (2007, forthcoming) – which we saw only after completing 
the first draft of this paper – uses a similar approach to examine the impact of 
increased exchange rate regimes on bilateral trade, finding that moves towards greater 
‘fixity’ of exchange rate arrangements have a positive impact on trade. Our results are 
broadly consistent with this general finding but, as we indicate below, our more 
detailed exchange rate classification allows us to distinguish more clearly how 
different pair-wise exchange rate regimes affect trade through their impact on 
exchange rate uncertainty, transactions costs and economies of scope arising from 
arrangements linking individual countries with supranational currency arrangements.  
2 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) derive comparable results for a model in which 
each country produces a product within each product class. 
3 Some geographical measures such as distance may appear to be time-invariant even 
though the notion of  ‘economic’ distance which they aim to reflect is not.  See, for 
example, Brun et al (2005). 
4 Year dummies can be thought of as allowing for any common time-varying effects 
such as trends in US inflation (and/or in the dollar exchange rates used to convert 
other countries’ trade into dollars). 
5 The classification used here is the same as that in Adam and Cobham (2007), where 
a more detailed explanation is given, except that here we distinguish the cases where 
two countries are, respectively, in the same currency union, or pegged to the same 
anchor currency, or managing their currencies with respect to the same reference 
currency, from the cases where one country is in a currency union which uses the 
currency of the other as its anchor (ANCHORCU), or one country is pegged to the   27
 
currency of the other (ANCHORPEG), or one country is managing its currency with 
respect to the currency of the other (ANCHORREF). 
6 The relatively large value of the income elasticity of trade relative to the theoretical 
prior of one may reflect the fact that the dependent variable is calculated as the log of 
average bi-directional trade rather than the average of log bi-directional trade 
(Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). 
7 A similar rise in the adjusted R-squared when CFEs are added can be found in 
Mélitz (2003). 
8 The world trade resistance terms are the same for all countries in any year but may 
differ between years; they are therefore perfectly collinear with the year dummies. 
However we need to include them in the estimation in order to be able to vary them in 
any simulations. 
9 We have also experimented with weighting the trade costs by (country pair) shares 
in world trade, which may have some intuitive merit but cannot be motivated 
theoretically. The results have the same general pattern as, but are rather more erratic 
than, those for either GDP or equal weights. Given this variability, together with the 
lack of theoretical basis, we do not present any results from such regressions. 
10 We have also experimented with restricting the modelling of the MTR and WTR 
terms to the exchange rate regimes only. The results are close to those where the 
standard control variables are included in the MTR/WTR terms as well.  
11 The regimes with large confidence intervals are typically those where the number 
of observations (see Table 2) is relatively small, e.g. the ANCHOR– regimes.  
12 In addition it should be noted that our SAMECU variable differs from Rose’s strict 
currency union dummy insofar as (a) SAMECU is 1 but Rose’s custrict is 0 where 
two countries each have (institutionally separate) currency unions or currency board   28
 
arrangements with the same anchor currency, eg Argentina and Hong Kong in the 
1990s, and (b) SAMECU is 0 and custrict is 1 in some post-independence years when, 
according to Reinhart and Rogoff and other sources, some of the colonial currency 
board arrangements became pegs rather than currency boards. 
13 We use 2003 rather than 2004, the latest year for which we have data, because the 
dataset is less complete in the final year. 
14 Rose and van Wincoop (2001) also report some marginal effects which are smaller 
than their average effects, but their results are not properly comparable with ours.   29
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F  the average value of real bilateral trade (constant US dollars)  
D  the great circle distance between most populous cities (standard miles) 
Y  real GDP (constant US dollars) 
Pop  the population of the country 
 
Elements of vector b:  
Area  the area of the country (square kilometres) 
Lang  a dummy with value 1 if the two countries have the same language, and 0 
otherwise 
ComBord  a dummy variable with value 1 if the two countries have a common 
border 
Landl  the number of landlocked countries in the pair (0, 1 or 2) 
Island  the number of countries in the pair which are islands (0, 1 or 2) 
Comcol  a dummy with value 1 if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with same 
coloniser, and 0 otherwise 
Colony  a dummy with value 1 if i ever colonised j or vice versa 
Curcol  a dummy with value 1 if i and j are colonies at time t 
ComNat  a dummy with value 1 if i and j are part of the same nation at time t 
Regional  a dummy with value 1 if i and j belong to the same regional trade 
agreement at time t 




{yrt}  a set of time fixed effects 
{Ci}  a set of country fixed effects. 
 
Data sources: 
Data on variables from F above to GSP taken from Rose (2003) and extended by us 
from 1998 to 2004, except for data on distance most of which was given to us by 
Jacques Mélitz. 
Data on exchange rate regimes constructed by us, see section 2 above and Adam and 
Cobham (2007). 
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Appendix B: A modification to Baier and Bergstrand’s (2006) method 
Baier and Bergstrand (BB) have two centres for their Taylor expansions:  
(a) frictionless, i.e. tij = t = 1 for all i,j = 1…N 
(b) symmetric, i.e. tij = t > 1 for all i,j = 1…N and GDP shares of all countries are the 
same, θi = 1/N for all i,j = 1…N 
We propose a third centre: 
(c) common trade costs and multilateral resistances, 
i.e. tij = t > 1 for all i,j = 1…N and Pi = Pj = P for all i,j = 1…N 
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Taylor expansion of BB’s equation (14) using this centre gives equation [A2]: 
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Substituting t = P
2 into [A2], we get [A3]: 
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Cancelling −(1 ) ln P σ −  from both sides, and dividing them by 
1 P
σ − , we get [A4]: 
1 ( 1) l n (1 ) l n ( 1) l n ij j j j i j
jj j
PP t σθ σ θ σ θ +− = + − +− ∑∑ ∑  
Using  j
j
θ ∑  = 1 and dividing both sides by 1 – σ, we get     33
ln ln ln ij j j i j
jj
PP t θθ =− + ∑∑        [ A 5 ]  
Multiply both sides by θi and sum over N: 
ln ln ln ii j j i j i j
ij i j
PP t θθ θ θ =− + ∑∑∑ ∑  
So we have  ln j j
j
P θ ∑ = 0.5 ln ij i j
ij
t θθ ∑∑       [ A 6 ]  
Substitute [A6] into [A5], we have 
ln ln ij i j
j
Pt θ =∑ − 0.5 ln ij i j
ij
t θθ ∑∑        [ A 7 ]  
Substituting from [A7] and correspondingly for ln Pj in equation (4) of the text, and 
collecting terms, gives equation (6) of the text as our estimating equation.    34
Table 1: Classification of exchange rate regimes 
R&R fine code  R&R description New  classification 
1  No separate legal tender 
2  Currency board arrangement or 
Currency board or currency 
union 
2 Pre-announced  peg 
3  Pre-announced horizontal band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2% 




5 Pre-announced  crawling  peg 
6  Pre-announced crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
7  De facto crawling peg 
8  De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-2% 
9  Pre-announced crawling band that is 




Managed floating with a 
reference currency 
10  De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-5% 
11  Moving band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-2% (i.e. allows for both 
appreciation and depreciation over time) 
12 Managed  floating 
Managed floating (without a 
reference currency)  
13  Freely floating  Freely floating 
14  Freely falling  Freely falling 
15  Dual market in which parallel market 
data is missing 
[allocated elsewhere] 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); text. 
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Table 2: Classification and distribution of exchange rate regimes by country pair 
Description of exchange rate regime by country 
pair 
Dummy variable  Percent 
of Total 
both countries use the same currency in a currency 
union and/or as the anchor for a currency board 
SAMECU 1.3 
one country is in a currency union/currency board for 
which the other country’s currency is the anchor 
ANCHORCU 0.8 
both countries are in currency unions or operate 
currency boards, but with different anchors 
DIFFCU 1.1 
one country is in a currency union/currency board with 
an anchor to which the other pegs 
SAMECUPEG 0.9 
one country is in currency union/currency board with 
one anchor while the other pegs to different anchor 
DIFFCUPEG 3.4 
both countries peg to the same currency  SAMEPEG  1.8 
one country is pegging to the other country’s currency  ANCHORPEG  0.4 
both countries peg but to different anchors  DIFFPEG  1.3 
one currency is in currency union/board with anchor 
with reference to which the other is managed 
SAMECUREF 3.0 
one currency is in currency union/board with anchor 
other than reference to which the other is managed 
DIFFCUREF 6.5 
one country is pegged to the currency with reference 
to which the other’s currency is managed 
SAMEPEGREF 5.3 
one country is pegged to a currency other than that 
with reference to which the other’s is managed 
DIFFPEGREF 5.8 
both countries have managed floats with the same 
reference currency 
SAMEREF 4.7 
one country is managing its float with reference to the 
currency of the other 
ANCHORREF 0.7 
both countries are managing their floats, but with 
different reference currencies 
DIFFREF 5.4 
one country is in currency union/board, the other has a 
managed float with no specified reference currency 
CUMAN 6.2 
one country pegs, the other has a managed float with 
no specified reference currency 
PEGMAN 6.7 
both countries have managed floats, one with and one 
without a specified reference currency 
REFMAN 13.1 





one country is in a currency union/currency board, the 
other has a floating currency 
CUFLOAT 2.1 
one country pegs, the other has a floating currency  PEGFLOAT  1.5 
one country is managing its currency with a specific 
reference, the other has a floating currency 
REFFLOAT 3.2 
one country is managing its currency without a 
specific reference, the other has a floating currency 
MANFLOAT 2.5 
one country is in currency union/board, the other’s 
currency is freely falling  
CUFALL 2.6 
one country pegs, the other’s currency is freely falling  PEGFALL  3.0 
one country pegs has a managed float with a specified  REFFALL  5.9   36
reference, the other’s currency is freely falling 
one country pegs has a managed float with no 
reference, the other’s currency is freely falling 
MANFALL 3.7 
both countries’ currencies are freely falling  FALLFALL  1.0 
one country has a floating currency, the other’s 
currency is freely falling 
FALLFLOAT 1.1 
both countries have a flexible exchange rate  FLOATFLOAT  0.4 
Total Observations   183,692 
 Table 3: The baseline gravity model 
Dependent Variable: Log bilateral trade (constant US dollars)
Pooled OLS Estimation.  Sample: 1973-2004 [unbalanced panel]
[1] [2]
estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic
Constant -28.28 -70.47 -27.74 -65.78
Basic variables
log product real GDP 1.33 101.10 1.32 101.09
log product population -0.42 26.73 -0.41 -26.39
log distance -1.29 -53.04 -1.30 -52.83
Standard controls
log product area -0.07 -8.22 -0.08 -8.94
landlocked -0.31 -9.13 -0.33 -9.74
island 0.04 1.02 -0.02 -0.42
common language 0.38 8.60 0.34 7.67
common border 0.58 4.47 0.54 4.24
common colony 0.56 7.67 0.51 7.01
current colony 1.79 6.42 1.83 6.49
ever colony 0.99 8.69 1.04 8.94
common country -0.76 -0.52 -0.71 -0.49
regional trade agreement 1.10 6.75 0.96 5.62
































year dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.667 0.671
F[Year dummy effects=0] [2]  80.65 [0.000] 252.17 [0.000]
F[Exchange rate dummy effects=0] [3]  - 100.3 [0.000]
No. observations 183692 183692
Notes: [1] heteroscedastic and autocorrelation robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
[2] F-test against joint significance of year dummies (probability in brackets).
[3] F-test against joint significance of exchange rate dummies (probability in brackets).Table 4: Adding CFEs  
Dependent Variable: Log bilateral trade (constant US dollars)
Pooled OLS Estimation.  Sample: 1973-2004 [unbalanced panel]
[3] [4]
estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic
Constant -25.28 -51.54 -25.46 -50.37
Basic variables
log product real GDP 1.24 70.51 1.23 70.52
log product population -0.33 -15.51 -0.34 -15.58
log distance -1.30 -50.90 -1.27 -48.78
Standard controls
log product area -0.11 -8.45 -0.10 -7.92
landlocked -0.56 -13.52 -0.56 -13.43
island -0.09 -1.62 -0.07 -1.36
common language 0.39 8.32 0.38 8.07
common border 0.50 4.00 0.49 4.00
common colony 0.60 8.44 0.54 7.66
current colony 1.53 5.61 1.56 5.68
ever colony 1.03 8.71 1.00 8.45
common country -0.67 -0.50 -0.63 -0.47
regional trade agreement 0.98 4.87 0.92 4.55
































year dummies Yes Yes
country dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.704 0.705
F[Year dummy effects=0] [2]  77.94 [0.000] 76.14 [0.000]
F[country dummy effects=0] [3]  18.7 [0.000] 18.08 [0.000]
F[Exchange rate dummy effects=0] [4]  - 6.66 [0.000]
No. observations 183692 183692
Notes: [1] heteroscedastic and autocorrelation robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
[2] F-test against joint significance of year dummies (probability in brackets).
[3] F-test against joint significance of CFE dummies (probability in brackets).




Table 5: Adding CPFEs  
Dependent Variable: Log bilateral trade (constant US dollars)
Pooled OLS Estimation.  Sample: 1973-2004 [unbalanced panel]
[5] [6]
estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic
Constant -23.12 -27.82 -22.69 -12.15
Basic variables
log product real GDP 0.81 72.67 0.80 30.82
log product populatio -0.18 -7.80 -0.17 -3.22
log distance - -
Standard controls
log product area - -
landlocked - -
island - -
common language - -
common border - -
common colony - -
current colony 1.53 3.61 1.38 2.47
ever colony - -
common country - -
regional trade agree -0.65 -3.65 -0.65 -1.83
































year dummies Yes Yes
country pair fixed eff Yes Yes
 R
2 overall 0.518 0.522
 R
2 within 0.072 0.075
F[Year dummy effe 50.81 [0.000] 46.53 [0.000]
F[CPFE dummy eff 27.84 [0.000] 27.41 [0.000]
F[Exchange rate dum - 8.97 [0.000]
No. observations 183692 183692
Notes: [1] heteroscedastic and autocorrelation robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
[2] F-test against joint significance of year dummies (probability in brackets).
[3] F-test against joint significance of CPFE dummies (probability in brackets).
[4] F-test against joint significance of exchange rate dummies (probability in brackets).2
Table 6: Basic model plus standard controls with MTRs  
Dependent Variable: Log bilateral trade (constant US dollars)
Pooled OLS Estimation.  Sample: 1973-2004 [unbalanced panel]
[7=1] [8] [9]
estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic
Constant -28.28 -70.47 -29.70 -74.09 -29.07 -72.39
Basic variables
log product real GDP 1.33 101.10 1.36 100.75 1.35 100.67
log product population -0.42 26.73 -0.41 -26.17 -0.42 -26.63
log distance -1.29 -53.04 -1.30 -52.85 -1.30 -53.01
Standard controls
log product area -0.07 -8.22 -0.08 -9.14 -0.08 -8.56
landlocked -0.31 -9.13 -0.34 -9.88 -0.32 -9.25
island 0.04 1.02 0.03 0.88 0.04 1.00
common language 0.38 8.60 0.38 8.33 0.38 8.33
common border 0.58 4.47 0.57 4.34 0.57 4.40
common colony 0.56 7.67 0.56 7.69 0.56 7.66
current colony 1.79 6.42 1.74 5.80 1.77 5.97
ever colony 0.99 8.69 0.96 8.39 0.99 8.68
common country -0.76 -0.52 -0.70 -0.48 -0.75 -0.51
regional trade agreement 1.10 6.75 1.12 6.86 1.10 6.76
GSP preferences 0.71 19.61 0.74 20.28 0.72 19.84
year dummies Yes Yes Yes
country dummies No No No
MTRs (weights) No Yes (GDP) Yes (equal)
Adjusted R
2 0.667 0.665 0.666
F[Year dummy effects=0] [ 80.65 [0.000] 73.64 [0.000] 72.95 [0.000]
No. observations 183692 183692 183692
Notes: [1] heteroscedastic and autocorrelation robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
[2] F-test against joint significance of year dummies (probability in brackets).c
Table 7: The full model with MTRs
Dependent Variable: Log bilateral trade (constant US dollars)
Pooled OLS Estimation.  Sample: 1973-2004 [unbalanced panel]
[10=2] [11] [12]
estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic
Constant -27.74 -65.78 -29.21 -69.33 -28.53 -67.74
Basic variables
log product real GDP 1.32 101.09 1.34 100.36 1.33 100.65
log product population -0.41 -26.39 -0.40 -25.54 -0.41 -26.23
log distance -1.30 -52.83 -1.30 -52.48 -1.30 -52.77
Standard controls
log product area -0.08 -8.94 -0.09 -9.72 -0.08 -9.25
landlocked -0.33 -9.74 -0.36 -10.42 -0.34 -9.85
island -0.02 -0.42 -0.01 -0.32 -0.02 -0.41
common language 0.34 7.67 0.34 7.66 0.34 7.62
common border 0.54 4.24 0.53 4.14 0.54 4.18
common colony 0.51 7.01 0.50 6.98 0.51 7.00
current colony 1.83 6.49 1.78 6.26 1.81 6.44
ever colony 1.04 8.94 1.02 8.70 1.04 8.93
common country -0.71 -0.49 -0.65 -0.46 -0.69 -0.48
regional trade agreem 0.96 5.62 0.99 5.82 0.96 5.64
GSP preferences 0.68 18.76 0.71 19.44 0.69 19.00
Exchange rate effects
SAMECU 1.04 6.72 1.05 6.78 1.04 6.70
ANCHORCU 0.56 3.42 0.53 3.30 0.56 3.43
DIFFCU 0.58 3.92 0.58 3.90 0.58 3.94
SAMECUPEG 0.34 2.33 0.40 2.75 0.35 2.43
DIFFCUPEG 0.19 2.10 0.21 2.29 0.20 2.18
SAMEPEG 0.05 0.47 0.09 0.83 0.06 0.59
ANCHORPEG 0.81 5.01 0.77 4.82 0.81 5.01
DIFFPEG 0.19 1.97 0.23 2.37 0.20 2.08
SAMECUREF 0.48 4.90 0.54 5.41 0.50 5.01
ANCHORREF 0.92 6.35 0.86 5.93 0.93 6.38
DIFFCUREF 0.34 4.43 0.36 4.55 0.35 4.53
SAMEPEGREF 0.13 1.72 0.17 2.23 0.15 1.87
DIFFPEGREF 0.21 2.98 0.26 3.64 0.23 3.19
SAMEREF 0.29 3.81 0.33 4.26 0.30 3.96
DIFFREF 0.29 4.08 0.34 4.81 0.31 4.33
REFMAN 0.19 3.03 0.21 3.50 0.19 3.17
CUMAN 0.09 1.15 0.10 1.31 0.10 1.22
PEGMAN -0.05 -0.78 -0.03 -0.38 -0.05 -0.67
MANMAN 0.00 0.00 0.00
CUFLOAT 0.59 6.47 0.55 6.00 0.60 6.51
PEGFLOAT 0.69 7.31 0.70 7.36 0.70 7.39
REFFLOAT 0.60 7.38 0.60 7.34 0.61 7.46
MANFLOAT 0.60 7.44 0.56 6.98 0.60 7.43
CUFALL 0.04 0.41 0.06 0.67 0.05 0.49
PEGFALL -0.16 -1.83 -0.13 -1.53 -0.15 -1.75
REFFALL 0.23 3.31 0.26 3.76 0.24 3.42
MANFALL -0.17 -2.21 -0.15 -1.96 -0.17 -2.16
FALLFALL -0.11 -0.89 -0.10 -0.86 -0.11 -0.90
FALLFLOAT 0.61 5.28 0.58 5.15 0.60 5.27
FLOATFLOAT 0.96 6.53 0.89 5.99 0.96 6.50
year dummies Yes Yes Yes
country dummies No No No
MTRs (weights) No Yes (GDP) Yes (equal)
Adj
2 usted R 0.671 0.669 0.671
F[Year dummy effe 80.32 [0.000] 72.09 [0.000] 71.48 [0.000]
F[Exchange rate dum 12.56 [0.000] 11.42 [0.000] 12.38 [0.000]
No. observations 183692 183692 183692
Notes: [1] heteroscedastic and autocorrelation robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
[2] F-test against joint significance of year dummies (probability in brackets).
[3] F-test against joint significance of exchange rate dummies (probability in brackets).m
Table 8: The full model with MTRs and CFEs
Dependent Variable: Log bilateral trade (constant US dollars)
Pooled OLS Estimation.  Sample: 1973-2004 [unbalanced panel]
[13=4] [14] [15] [14]
estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic estimate t-statistic Partial
r-squared
Constant -25.46 -50.37 -26.96 -52.77 -26.19 -51.62
Basic variables
log product real GDP 1.23 70.52 1.24 68.80 1.24 69.94 0.446
log product population -0.34 -15.58 -0.30 -13.80 -0.33 -15.19 -0.103
log distance -1.27 -48.78 -1.27 -48.53 -1.28 -48.80 -0.361
Standard controls
log product area -0.10 -7.92 -0.12 -8.83 -0.11 -8.20 -0.074
landlocked -0.56 -13.43 -0.60 -14.15 -0.57 -13.60 -0.106
island -0.07 -1.36 -0.06 -1.20 -0.07 -1.36 -0.009
common language 0.38 8.07 0.38 8.08 0.38 8.04 0.064
common border 0.49 4.00 0.49 3.97 0.49 3.98 0.035
common colony 0.54 7.66 0.54 7.58 0.54 7.66 0.063
current colony 1.56 5.68 1.53 5.70 1.55 5.68 0.040
ever colony 1.00 8.45 1.00 8.38 1.00 8.45 0.057
common country -0.63 -0.47 -0.56 -0.43 -0.62 -0.46 -0.004
regional trade agreem 0.92 4.55 0.95 4.67 0.92 4.52 0.048
GSP preferences 0.43 9.58 0.45 10.06 0.43 9.69 0.067
Exchange rate effects
SAMECU 0.92 6.29 0.96 6.54 0.92 6.28 0.043
ANCHORCU 0.33 2.17 0.37 2.42 0.34 2.23 0.015
DIFFCU 0.31 2.25 0.35 2.47 0.32 2.30 0.016
SAMECUPEG 0.48 3.49 0.56 4.04 0.50 3.61 0.024
DIFFCUPEG 0.11 1.34 0.15 1.88 0.12 1.47 0.010
SAMEPEG 0.28 3.00 0.33 3.50 0.30 3.16 0.019
ANCHORPEG 0.22 1.38 0.31 1.96 0.24 1.50 0.009
DIFFPEG 0.16 1.79 0.21 2.41 0.17 1.96 0.011
SAMECUREF 0.47 5.42 0.53 6.03 0.48 5.54 0.034
ANCHORREF 0.33 2.44 0.39 2.81 0.35 2.54 0.014
DIFFCUREF 0.15 2.04 0.18 2.48 0.16 2.18 0.014
SAMEPEGREF 0.29 4.23 0.34 4.85 0.31 4.41 0.026
DIFFPEGREF 0.11 1.83 0.16 2.61 0.13 2.06 0.013
SAMEREF 0.35 5.12 0.38 5.60 0.36 5.28 0.028
DIFFREF 0.17 2.72 0.21 3.39 0.19 2.95 0.016
REFMAN 0.14 2.52 0.16 2.99 0.14 2.66 0.015
CUMAN 0.01 0.18 0.04 0.56 0.02 0.26 0.003
PEGMAN -0.01 -0.18 0.02 0.38 0.00 -0.04 0.002
MANMAN 0.00 0.00 0.00
CUFLOAT 0.20 2.32 0.22 2.61 0.21 2.44 0.012
PEGFLOAT 0.44 5.06 0.50 5.73 0.46 5.23 0.026
REFFLOAT 0.32 4.45 0.36 4.99 0.33 4.61 0.023
MANFLOAT 0.27 3.68 0.30 3.98 0.28 3.76 0.018
CUFALL 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.52 0.02 0.19 0.003
PEGFALL -0.12 -1.57 -0.09 -1.14 -0.11 -1.45 -0.006
REFFALL 0.21 3.50 0.24 3.90 0.22 3.62 0.019
MANFALL -0.10 -1.37 -0.08 -1.16 -0.09 -1.32 -0.006
FALLFALL -0.14 -1.27 -0.13 -1.21 -0.14 -1.26 -0.006
FALLFLOAT 0.28 2.73 0.33 3.19 0.29 2.80 0.015
FLOATFLOAT 0.43 3.32 0.44 3.32 0.44 3.37 0.013
year dummies Yes Yes Yes
country dummies No No No
MTRs (weights) No Yes (GDP) Yes (equal)
Adjusted R
2 0.705 0.703 0.705
F[Year dummy effect 76.14 [0.000] 69.46 [0.000] 69.00 [0.000]
F[country dummy eff 18.08 [0.000] 18.06 [0.000] 18.14 [0.000]
F[Exchange rate du 6.66 [0.000] 7.1 [0.000] 6.73 [0.000]
No. observations 183692 183692 183692
Notes: [1] heteroscedastic and autocorrelation robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
[2] F-test against joint significance of year dummies (probability in brackets).






Table 9: The effects of changes in countries' exchange rate regimes on their trade  
Case I: Kenya and Tanzania form a new currency union [from managed floats]
Baseline Trade and Distribution Initial distribution of trade
Total Trade US $ bloc Europe Latin Americ Asia Rest of Africa EAC Other
Kenya 18.03 9.1% 30.1% 0.5% 19.0% 17.8% 2.6% 20.8%
Tanzania 18.35 2.0% 13.3% 0.1% 15.3% 8.6% 2.5% 58.1%
Revised distribution
Percentage point change in trade
Kenya Tanzania US $ bloc Europe Latin Americ Asia Rest of Africa EAC Other
Total Overall 12.98% 15.37% Kenya 8.2% 32.9% 0.5% 17.3% 15.0% 5.9% 20.3%
due to Direct 13.16% 15.59% Tanzania 1.8% 14.6% 0.1% 13.6% 7.1% 5.7% 57.2%
MTR -0.46% -0.57%
WTR 0.29% 0.36%
Case II: Kenya Tanzania and Uganda form a new currency union 
[Kenya and Tanzania from managed floats, Uganda from a free float]
Baseline Trade and Distribution Initial distribution of trade
Total Trade US $ bloc Europe Latin Americ Asia Rest of Africa EAC Other
Kenya 18.03 9.1% 30.1% 0.5% 19.0% 11.1% 9.3% 20.8%
Tanzania 18.35 2.0% 13.3% 0.1% 15.3% 8.4% 2.8% 58.1%
Uganda 4.689 6.2% 28.2% 0.3% 16.4% 10.8% 26.7% 11.5%
Revised distribution
Percentage point change in trade 
Kenya Tanzania Uganda US $ bloc Europe Latin Americ Asia Rest of Africa EAC Other
Total Overall 19.75% 15.62% 16.04% Kenya 7.7% 31.0% 0.4% 16.3% 8.9% 16.5% 19.2%
due to Direct 20.01% 15.84% 16.36% Tanzania 1.8% 14.6% 0.1% 13.5% 6.8% 6.1% 57.0%
MTR -0.70% -0.58% -0.72% Uganda 4.6% 24.7% 0.2% 11.2% 7.4% 44.7% 7.2%
WTR 0.44% 0.36% 0.40%
Case III: Italy leaves the Euro [from membership of EMU to a managed float]
Baseline Trade and Distribution Initial distribution of trade
Total Trade US $ bloc Europe Latin Americ Asia Africa Other
Italy 1621.6 Italy 7.5% 64.6% 2.2% 7.4% 2.3% 15.9%
Revised distribution
Percentage point change in trade 
Italy US $ bloc Europe Latin Americ Asia Africa Other
Total Overall -33.35% Italy 11.7% 48.6% 3.2% 11.0% 3.4% 22.1%
due to Direct -36.07%
MTR 4.43%
WTR -1.71%
Memorandum items Kenya Tanzania Uganda Italy
share in world GDP 0.09% 0.08% 0.07% 2.70%
Top 10 trading partners UK Qatar Kenya Germany
UAE South Africa UK France
US India South Africa US
Uganda China India Spain
Netherlands Japan UAE UK
Saudi Arabia Zambia US Austria
South Africa Kenya Netherlands Switzerland
China UK Japan China
Germany UAE China Russia

















































































ER coeffs eqn 13 ER coeffs eqn 14 ER coeffs eqn 15 ER coeffs eqn 10 ER coeffs eqn 11 ER coeffs eqn 12Figure 3: Exchange rate coefficients from Equation [14]
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